This isn’t really true. Stalin was often described as a quiet listener in collective meetings, and was widely beloved. He developed a cult of personality against his own wishes, due to leading the country successfully during its most chaotic and desparate periods. This happens to all leaders in such situations, FDR was almost revered as a god in the US. Stalin turned down awards like the Hero of the Soviet Union, and refused to change Marxism-Leninism to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, essentially equating his own contributions (particularly on the national question and linguistics) to an extremely minor aspect compared to Marx and Lenin.
Ah yes, I always forget how the purges were just a big whoopsie doopsie misunderstanding and uncle Joe was actually a stoic, quiet voiced totally not good friend to that big bad Hitler guy.
Molotov-ribbentrop pact is a fact of history. Not to mention during the war, Stalin himself authorized German u-boats to utilize naval bases around Murmansk to hide between raids against the British. Tell me how Stalin was actually playing 4D chess by allowing Hitler into Soviet naval bases.
The communists were never allies with the Nazis. A non-aggression pact is not an alliance. The communists spent the decade prior trying to form an anti-Nazi coalition force, such as the Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance which was pitched by the communists and rejected by the British and French. The communists hated the Nazis from the beginning, as the Nazi party rose to prominence by killing communists and labor organizers, cemented bourgeois rule, and was violently racist and imperialist, while the communists opposed all of that.
When the many talks of alliances with the west all fell short, the Soviets reluctantly agreed to sign a non-agression pact, in order to delay the coming war that everyone knew was happening soon. Throughout the last decade, Britain, France, and other western countries had formed pacts with Nazi Germany, such as the Four-Power Pact, the German-French-Non-Agression Pact, and more. Molotov-Ribbentrop was unique among the non-agression pacts with Nazi Germany in that it was right on the eve of war, and was the first between the USSR and Nazi Germany. It was a last resort, when the west was content from the beginning with working alongside Hitler.
Harry Truman, in 1941 in front of the Senate, stated:
If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.
Not only that, but it was the Soviet Union that was responsible for 4/5ths of total Nazi deaths, and winning the war against the Nazis. The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. When the USSR went into Poland, it stayed mostly to areas Poland had invaded and annexed a few decades prior. Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.
Churchill did not take the Nazis as a serious threat, and was horrified when FDR and Stalin made a joke about executing Nazis. Churchill starved millions to death in India in preventable ways, and had this to say about it:
I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion. The famine was their own fault for breeding like rabbits.
Meanwhile, the soviet famine in the 1930s was the last major famine outside of wartime in the USSR, because collectivized farming achieved food security in a region where famine was common. As a consequence, life expectancy doubled:
The Nazis and soviets were never allies. A non-aggression pact is not an alliance, and the non-aggression pact between the soviets and the Nazis was unique among the other non-aggression pacts in that it was on the eve of war. The soviets knew war was coming, and so bought more time to prepare.
This is ignoring the secret protocol in which the USSR and Nazi Germany carved up eastern Europe into spheres of influence: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/addsepro.asp And yes it does mention carving up Poland, it describes what the border should be if Poland is invaded (wink wink) and then declares that leaving a Polish rump state or not will be decided later. It also in no uncertain terms states that the Soviets can take Bessarabia.
It is the only non-aggression pact with such a protocol. The western powers did not sign such a deal with the Nazis in which third-parties are carved up.
Negotiations between the west and the USSR broke down for several reasons, notably:
Deep mutual mistrust, in part due to the mass terror and the purges in the USSR, and notably France failing to make good on an earlier promise for a military agreement. Both sides believed the other might abuse a pact to draw them into war with Germany.
Disagreement over the Baltics; the USSR believed Hitler would attack through those states, but the west did not want to commit to security guarantees to states that did not want them (Estonia and Latvia rejected them, fearing it would incense the Germans).
Once the west finally yielded on guaranteeing the Baltics, the USSR refused to do the same for the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland.
The USSR demanded that in case of war, the Red Army would be given free passage through Poland and Romania. The west told the USSR that they’d have to negotiate that with those countries themselves, and they could not unilaterally allow it without having either country agree.
There was disagreement over what would constitute “indirect aggression”, eg what the Nazis did to anschluss Austria.
The USSR kept hammering on immediate, unconditional action in case of war with Germany. The west wanted consultations first, as they were worried the USSR would do something in the Baltics to trigger war with Germany, drawing the west in for a cause they might not support.
The west had little motivation to push for a pact, as it had already provided security guarantees to Poland and Romania. The only other land access route was through Memel into Lithuania, but Lithuania had ceded Memel and signed a non-aggression pact with the Germans, so the west did not think an attack over the Baltics was as likely as the Soviets believed it was.
Ultimately the security guarantee on Poland brought the west into war with Germany. The USSR, despite hammering on immediate action against Germany during negotiations before, instead opted for the annexation of the Baltics, Bessarabia and eastern Poland, and an attack on Finland. It took nearly two years for the USSR to begin fighting the Nazis, and only because the Nazis invaded them first.
The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. Spheres of influence were not agreements to jointly work together. When the USSR went into Poland, it stayed mostly to areas Poland had invaded and annexed a few decades prior. Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.
Further, you’re ignoring the Munich Agreement, where Czechoslovakia was given to the Nazis by the west. Not only was the west on good terms with the Nazis, signing many non-aggression pacts, they fostered healthy relationships. Finally, the Soviets were reasonably highly suspicious that Britain and Germany would ally. This was not unfounded, both were friendly enough until the outbreak of war. The Soviets desperately needed to make sure that the British and Germans would not ally, which reasonably would have happened had the Soviet Union taken unilateral action against the Nazis, rather than waiting to be attacked first.
Stalin was said to have “obsessed over quantitative and qualitative” improvements in arms in the years leading up to World War II, and had soldiers stationed on high alert, preparing for a German attack. Despite the insistence of many Generals to muster forces on the German border, it was Stalin’s insistence that forces not be so concentrated that prevented the Nazis from totally routing the Red Army, enabling the greatest counteroffensive in history.
Hitler himself was quite honest at times, to himself at least:
How can such a primitive people manage such technical achievements in such a short time!
…
The fact that Stalin has raised the Russian standard of living is unquestionable. People don’t go hungry [at the moment when Operation Barbarossa was launched]. In general, it’s necessary to recognize that they have built factories of similar importance to Hermann Goering Reichswerke where two years ago nothing but unknown villages existed. We come across railway lines that aren’t even marked on our maps.
The Soviets expected and planned for it, they were never allies with the Nazis.
The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. Spheres of influence were not agreements to jointly work together.
That’s historical revisionism not even supported by Russian historians. That page is full of nonsensical statements too. On the page dedicated to “disproving” the secret protocols, it makes two claims:
The secret protocols required that a Polish state exists still. Since the Germans destroyed it, the protocols were void.
The Germans were talking about setting up independent states east of the demarcation line, so clearly it wasn’t about partitioning Poland.
But the text of the secret protocols as I have linked already handily disproves both notions. First, it explicitly mentions that the question of whether a Polish state should remain is to be decided later; clearly this means that the existence of Poland itself is not a precondition for the protocols holding. The protocols also basically outline “what happens after Poland is invaded and how should it be divided”, you can call it a partitioning into spheres of influence if you like, but the protocols did not care exactly what the Soviets or Nazis would do on either side of the line, annexation, puppeting or otherwise. All that mattered was declaring where belonged to who. That’s colloquially known as a partitioning.
The setting up of independent states east of the line is also not proof of anything. This was being considered before the USSR invaded, and the Germans needed to decide on something with the remaining land. They opted for independent countries over puppet governments or direct annexation, so as to leave the area to the USSR to deal with.
Ultimately both countries invaded, and the Nazis retreated back to the demarcation line.
Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.
The USSR was aware of the defensive pact between the west and Poland, and the west declared war on Germany when they invaded Poland.
Further, you’re ignoring the Munich Agreement, where Czechoslovakia was given to the Nazis by the west. Not only was the west on good terms with the Nazis, signing many non-aggression pacts, they fostered healthy relationships.
The west was still on appeasement mode (which was a mistake in hindsight). But they were not on “friendly” terms at all, clearly evidenced by the fact they were still negotiating with the Soviets to form an alliance against the Germans. The west was actively negotiating treaties to contain Germany where possible, but not all countries targetted by the Nazis agreed to one since they were worried aligning against Hitler would make them a target (the concern of the Baltics for example).
Finally, the Soviets were reasonably highly suspicious that Britain and Germany would ally. This was not unfounded, both were friendly enough until the outbreak of war. The Soviets desperately needed to make sure that the British and Germans would not ally, which reasonably would have happened had the Soviet Union taken unilateral action against the Nazis, rather than waiting to be attacked first.
This was, as far as I could find, never a Soviet concern. They did not believe the west would ally with Hitler, rather they were mistrusting that the west would let the USSR fight Germany on its own, weakening both states. This was actually the same concern the west had, they feared the Soviets would pull the west into a war against Germany without a cause they could support. This deep mistrust was a key reason why the triple alliance failed to materialize. Ultimately it was the west that declared war on Germany first, and the Soviets indeed let them fight before being forced into the conflict by Germany.
You’re reading the spheres of influence aspect of Molotov-Ribbentrop with hermeneutics of suspicion. The implication on your end is that the Soviets expected the pact to hold, and to split Europe with Nazi Germany. This implies the expectation of a lasting alliance, which is immediately thrown out the window when you see just how much the Soviets were preparing for war against the Nazis, and that the Red Army was specifically told to watch out for German soldiers.
Regarding Poland in particular, the Soviet sphere of influence, again, was made up of areas Poland had violently annexed from countries like Lithuania and Ukraine only a couple decades prior. The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land. When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.
Would you want the entirety of Poland to go to the Nazis? Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?
As for the West, again, you ignore that at the time they were quite honest with wanting to contain the Bolsheviks. They were more than willing to work with the Nazis, America even kept trading with them during the war, and American factories were deliberately not targeted in Nazi Germany even if Nazis were hiding in them. Truman was honest:
If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.
The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off. France spread faulty rumors of a fabricated speech by Stalin wanting to conquest Europe, Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa, and the Nazis themselves were constantly posturing around either invading Britain, using Crete as a template for naval invasion, or making a deal with them. Before Barbarossa, Rudolf Hess flew to England, drawing the appearance of an impending deal.
The entirety of the pre-War period was a tumultuous game of trying to decide what the lines of the war would be. The west made it clear that it hated the Soviets, and the Soviets made it clear that they hated the Nazis, but did not want to risk both the Nazis and the west coming after them, which would have been unwinnable most likely. Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.
The USSR was aware of the defensive pact between the west and Poland, and the west declared war on Germany when they invaded Poland.
So you do think that the Soviets shouldn’t have entered Poland (after the government had already collapsed to secure the parts of Ukraine Lithuania and Belarus the Poles had occupied in the interwar period) and instead let the Nazis have full reign of the entire country until the Nazis decided to move further east?
The purges were a popularly supported response to genuine threats and infiltration. They were not a misunderstanding, but they did exceed initial expectations, which is why they were stopped. As for Hitler (and the rest of the fascist movement), the Soviets (Stalin included) absolutely despised him. That’s why the Soviets spent the 1930s ramping up industrial production as quickly as they could, and trying to form an anti-fascist coalition with the west (which the British and French tanked).
Stalin was said to have “obsessed over quantitative and qualitative” improvements in arms in the years leading up to World War II, and had soldiers stationed on high alert, preparing for a German attack. Despite the insistence of many Generals to muster forces on the German border, it was Stalin’s insistence that forces not be so concentrated that prevented the Nazis from totally routing the Red Army, enabling the greatest counteroffensive in history.
Hitler himself was quite honest at times, to himself at least:
How can such a primitive people manage such technical achievements in such a short time!
…
The fact that Stalin has raised the Russian standard of living is unquestionable. People don’t go hungry [at the moment when Operation Barbarossa was launched]. In general, it’s necessary to recognize that they have built factories of similar importance to Hermann Goering Reichswerke where two years ago nothing but unknown villages existed. We come across railway lines that aren’t even marked on our maps.
Statesian journalist and activist Anna Louise Strong actually met and spoke with Stalin, writing down her impressions:
My first impression of him was vaguely disappointing. A stocky figure in a simple suit of khaki color, direct, unassuming, whose first concern was to know whether I understood Russian sufficiently to take part in discussion. Not very imposing for so great a man, I thought. Then we sat down rather casually, and Stalin was not even at the head of the table; Voroshilov was. Stalin took a place where he could see all our faces and started the talk by a pointed question to the man against whom I had complained. After that Stalin seemed to become a sort of background, against which other people’s comments went on. The brilliant wit of Kaganovich, the cheerful chuckle of Voroshilov, the characteristics of the lesser people called to consult, all suddenly stood out. I began to understand them all and like them; I even began to understand the editor against whom I had complained. Suddenly I myself was talking and getting my facts out faster and more clearly than I ever did in my life. People seemed to agree with me. Everything got to the point very fast and smoothly, with Stalin saying less than anyone.
Afterward in thinking it over I realized how Stalin’s genius for listening helped each of us express ourselves and understand the others. I recalled his trick of repeating a word of mine either with questioning intonation or a slight emphasis, which suddenly made me feel I had either not quite seen the point or perhaps had overstated it, and so drove me to make it plainer. I recalled how he had done this to others also. Then I understood that his listening has been a dynamic force.
This listening habit dates back to the early days of his revolutionary career. “I remember him very well from the early days of our Party,” said a veteran Bolshevik to me. “A quiet youth who sat at the edge of the committee, saying almost nothing, but listening very much. Toward the end he would make a few comments, sometimes merely as questions. Gradually we came to see that he always summed up best our joint thinking.” The description will be recognized by anyone who ever met Stalin. In any group he is usually last to express his opinion. He does not want to block the full expression of others, as he might easily do by speaking first. Besides this, he is always learning by listening.
I highly recommended the book Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend by legendary communist Domenico Losurdo. Losurdo’s unique method in the book is to use near-exclusively western, anti-communist sources, including Goebbels, Hitler, the New York Times, and so forth to examine not just Stalin, but to explain why Stalin is both so hated and yet so loved. It’s a critique of the legend surrounding Stalin.
This isn’t really true. Stalin was often described as a quiet listener in collective meetings, and was widely beloved. He developed a cult of personality against his own wishes, due to leading the country successfully during its most chaotic and desparate periods. This happens to all leaders in such situations, FDR was almost revered as a god in the US. Stalin turned down awards like the Hero of the Soviet Union, and refused to change Marxism-Leninism to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, essentially equating his own contributions (particularly on the national question and linguistics) to an extremely minor aspect compared to Marx and Lenin.
Ah yes, I always forget how the purges were just a big whoopsie doopsie misunderstanding and uncle Joe was actually a stoic, quiet voiced totally not good friend to that big bad Hitler guy.
Thanks for reminding me.
Twelve year old who just discovered sarcasm
Now if only those tankies could read, they’d be real upset about it.
This is a children’s cartoon-ass story that falls apart at the slightest investigation. 80% of dead nazis died on the eastern front.
Molotov-ribbentrop pact is a fact of history. Not to mention during the war, Stalin himself authorized German u-boats to utilize naval bases around Murmansk to hide between raids against the British. Tell me how Stalin was actually playing 4D chess by allowing Hitler into Soviet naval bases.
People who believe that fascists, whose aim and total reason of being was to combat communism would be partners with them.
That is just embarrassing
The communists were never allies with the Nazis. A non-aggression pact is not an alliance. The communists spent the decade prior trying to form an anti-Nazi coalition force, such as the Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance which was pitched by the communists and rejected by the British and French. The communists hated the Nazis from the beginning, as the Nazi party rose to prominence by killing communists and labor organizers, cemented bourgeois rule, and was violently racist and imperialist, while the communists opposed all of that.
When the many talks of alliances with the west all fell short, the Soviets reluctantly agreed to sign a non-agression pact, in order to delay the coming war that everyone knew was happening soon. Throughout the last decade, Britain, France, and other western countries had formed pacts with Nazi Germany, such as the Four-Power Pact, the German-French-Non-Agression Pact, and more. Molotov-Ribbentrop was unique among the non-agression pacts with Nazi Germany in that it was right on the eve of war, and was the first between the USSR and Nazi Germany. It was a last resort, when the west was content from the beginning with working alongside Hitler.
Harry Truman, in 1941 in front of the Senate, stated:
Not only that, but it was the Soviet Union that was responsible for 4/5ths of total Nazi deaths, and winning the war against the Nazis. The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. When the USSR went into Poland, it stayed mostly to areas Poland had invaded and annexed a few decades prior. Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.
Churchill did not take the Nazis as a serious threat, and was horrified when FDR and Stalin made a joke about executing Nazis. Churchill starved millions to death in India in preventable ways, and had this to say about it:
Meanwhile, the soviet famine in the 1930s was the last major famine outside of wartime in the USSR, because collectivized farming achieved food security in a region where famine was common. As a consequence, life expectancy doubled:
The Nazis and soviets were never allies. A non-aggression pact is not an alliance, and the non-aggression pact between the soviets and the Nazis was unique among the other non-aggression pacts in that it was on the eve of war. The soviets knew war was coming, and so bought more time to prepare.
This is ignoring the secret protocol in which the USSR and Nazi Germany carved up eastern Europe into spheres of influence: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/addsepro.asp And yes it does mention carving up Poland, it describes what the border should be if Poland is invaded (wink wink) and then declares that leaving a Polish rump state or not will be decided later. It also in no uncertain terms states that the Soviets can take Bessarabia.
It is the only non-aggression pact with such a protocol. The western powers did not sign such a deal with the Nazis in which third-parties are carved up.
Negotiations between the west and the USSR broke down for several reasons, notably:
Ultimately the security guarantee on Poland brought the west into war with Germany. The USSR, despite hammering on immediate action against Germany during negotiations before, instead opted for the annexation of the Baltics, Bessarabia and eastern Poland, and an attack on Finland. It took nearly two years for the USSR to begin fighting the Nazis, and only because the Nazis invaded them first.
No notes on Churchill being a dickhead though.
Poland makes sense, but why Romania?
The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. Spheres of influence were not agreements to jointly work together. When the USSR went into Poland, it stayed mostly to areas Poland had invaded and annexed a few decades prior. Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.
Further, you’re ignoring the Munich Agreement, where Czechoslovakia was given to the Nazis by the west. Not only was the west on good terms with the Nazis, signing many non-aggression pacts, they fostered healthy relationships. Finally, the Soviets were reasonably highly suspicious that Britain and Germany would ally. This was not unfounded, both were friendly enough until the outbreak of war. The Soviets desperately needed to make sure that the British and Germans would not ally, which reasonably would have happened had the Soviet Union taken unilateral action against the Nazis, rather than waiting to be attacked first.
Stalin was said to have “obsessed over quantitative and qualitative” improvements in arms in the years leading up to World War II, and had soldiers stationed on high alert, preparing for a German attack. Despite the insistence of many Generals to muster forces on the German border, it was Stalin’s insistence that forces not be so concentrated that prevented the Nazis from totally routing the Red Army, enabling the greatest counteroffensive in history.
Hitler himself was quite honest at times, to himself at least:
…
The Soviets expected and planned for it, they were never allies with the Nazis.
That’s historical revisionism not even supported by Russian historians. That page is full of nonsensical statements too. On the page dedicated to “disproving” the secret protocols, it makes two claims:
But the text of the secret protocols as I have linked already handily disproves both notions. First, it explicitly mentions that the question of whether a Polish state should remain is to be decided later; clearly this means that the existence of Poland itself is not a precondition for the protocols holding. The protocols also basically outline “what happens after Poland is invaded and how should it be divided”, you can call it a partitioning into spheres of influence if you like, but the protocols did not care exactly what the Soviets or Nazis would do on either side of the line, annexation, puppeting or otherwise. All that mattered was declaring where belonged to who. That’s colloquially known as a partitioning.
The setting up of independent states east of the line is also not proof of anything. This was being considered before the USSR invaded, and the Germans needed to decide on something with the remaining land. They opted for independent countries over puppet governments or direct annexation, so as to leave the area to the USSR to deal with.
Ultimately both countries invaded, and the Nazis retreated back to the demarcation line.
The USSR was aware of the defensive pact between the west and Poland, and the west declared war on Germany when they invaded Poland.
The west was still on appeasement mode (which was a mistake in hindsight). But they were not on “friendly” terms at all, clearly evidenced by the fact they were still negotiating with the Soviets to form an alliance against the Germans. The west was actively negotiating treaties to contain Germany where possible, but not all countries targetted by the Nazis agreed to one since they were worried aligning against Hitler would make them a target (the concern of the Baltics for example).
This was, as far as I could find, never a Soviet concern. They did not believe the west would ally with Hitler, rather they were mistrusting that the west would let the USSR fight Germany on its own, weakening both states. This was actually the same concern the west had, they feared the Soviets would pull the west into a war against Germany without a cause they could support. This deep mistrust was a key reason why the triple alliance failed to materialize. Ultimately it was the west that declared war on Germany first, and the Soviets indeed let them fight before being forced into the conflict by Germany.
You’re reading the spheres of influence aspect of Molotov-Ribbentrop with hermeneutics of suspicion. The implication on your end is that the Soviets expected the pact to hold, and to split Europe with Nazi Germany. This implies the expectation of a lasting alliance, which is immediately thrown out the window when you see just how much the Soviets were preparing for war against the Nazis, and that the Red Army was specifically told to watch out for German soldiers.
Regarding Poland in particular, the Soviet sphere of influence, again, was made up of areas Poland had violently annexed from countries like Lithuania and Ukraine only a couple decades prior. The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land. When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.
Would you want the entirety of Poland to go to the Nazis? Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?
As for the West, again, you ignore that at the time they were quite honest with wanting to contain the Bolsheviks. They were more than willing to work with the Nazis, America even kept trading with them during the war, and American factories were deliberately not targeted in Nazi Germany even if Nazis were hiding in them. Truman was honest:
The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off. France spread faulty rumors of a fabricated speech by Stalin wanting to conquest Europe, Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa, and the Nazis themselves were constantly posturing around either invading Britain, using Crete as a template for naval invasion, or making a deal with them. Before Barbarossa, Rudolf Hess flew to England, drawing the appearance of an impending deal.
The entirety of the pre-War period was a tumultuous game of trying to decide what the lines of the war would be. The west made it clear that it hated the Soviets, and the Soviets made it clear that they hated the Nazis, but did not want to risk both the Nazis and the west coming after them, which would have been unwinnable most likely. Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.
So you do think that the Soviets shouldn’t have entered Poland (after the government had already collapsed to secure the parts of Ukraine Lithuania and Belarus the Poles had occupied in the interwar period) and instead let the Nazis have full reign of the entire country until the Nazis decided to move further east?
The purges were a popularly supported response to genuine threats and infiltration. They were not a misunderstanding, but they did exceed initial expectations, which is why they were stopped. As for Hitler (and the rest of the fascist movement), the Soviets (Stalin included) absolutely despised him. That’s why the Soviets spent the 1930s ramping up industrial production as quickly as they could, and trying to form an anti-fascist coalition with the west (which the British and French tanked).
Stalin was said to have “obsessed over quantitative and qualitative” improvements in arms in the years leading up to World War II, and had soldiers stationed on high alert, preparing for a German attack. Despite the insistence of many Generals to muster forces on the German border, it was Stalin’s insistence that forces not be so concentrated that prevented the Nazis from totally routing the Red Army, enabling the greatest counteroffensive in history.
Hitler himself was quite honest at times, to himself at least:
…
Statesian journalist and activist Anna Louise Strong actually met and spoke with Stalin, writing down her impressions:
I highly recommended the book Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend by legendary communist Domenico Losurdo. Losurdo’s unique method in the book is to use near-exclusively western, anti-communist sources, including Goebbels, Hitler, the New York Times, and so forth to examine not just Stalin, but to explain why Stalin is both so hated and yet so loved. It’s a critique of the legend surrounding Stalin.
Thanks for the references
No problem!