You’re reading the spheres of influence aspect of Molotov-Ribbentrop with hermeneutics of suspicion. The implication on your end is that the Soviets expected the pact to hold, and to split Europe with Nazi Germany. This implies the expectation of a lasting alliance, which is immediately thrown out the window when you see just how much the Soviets were preparing for war against the Nazis, and that the Red Army was specifically told to watch out for German soldiers.
Regarding Poland in particular, the Soviet sphere of influence, again, was made up of areas Poland had violently annexed from countries like Lithuania and Ukraine only a couple decades prior. The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land. When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.
Would you want the entirety of Poland to go to the Nazis? Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?
As for the West, again, you ignore that at the time they were quite honest with wanting to contain the Bolsheviks. They were more than willing to work with the Nazis, America even kept trading with them during the war, and American factories were deliberately not targeted in Nazi Germany even if Nazis were hiding in them. Truman was honest:
If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.
The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off. France spread faulty rumors of a fabricated speech by Stalin wanting to conquest Europe, Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa, and the Nazis themselves were constantly posturing around either invading Britain, using Crete as a template for naval invasion, or making a deal with them. Before Barbarossa, Rudolf Hess flew to England, drawing the appearance of an impending deal.
The entirety of the pre-War period was a tumultuous game of trying to decide what the lines of the war would be. The west made it clear that it hated the Soviets, and the Soviets made it clear that they hated the Nazis, but did not want to risk both the Nazis and the west coming after them, which would have been unwinnable most likely. Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.
The implication on your end is that the Soviets expected the pact to hold, and to split Europe with Nazi Germany.
Most certainly not. Stalin wasn’t that stupid. He knew war would eventually come, even if he was a bit blindsided because Hitler invaded before winning the battle of Britain. But the Soviets most definitely intended to make use of the pact with Hitler for their own gain, that being the annexation of eastern Poland, Bessarabia, the Baltics and eastern Finland.
The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land.
Do you think that the Soviets intended to let eastern Poland in their “sphere” as independent states? Since the protocols specifically leave the independence of any sort of Poland state up for debate later, the Soviets almost certainly intended to annex the land back. This is not exactly a controversial view, historians east and west agree on this reading.
When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.
The Soviets killed 100-150k people, deported another 300k to Siberia, and imprisoned half a million people. “Sparing them” has got to be a bit of a joke in this context, especially given that the USSR gave the Nazis carte-blanche to Holocaust away in western Poland. The Holocaust itself only became properly known to the world in 1942 anyway, so it’s not like the Soviets used that as their motivation to invade in 1939.
Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?
The USSR did not seriously believe that the west would ally with the Nazis against them. It was not a very realistic prospect either, since the west had already conceded quite a few points to the Soviets when they were negotiating the triple alliance regarding mutual defense, and that the west had signed several defense treaties to contain the Soviets specifically. They had not done so for say the Baltics, and even the guarantee for Poland only had provisions for direct action against Germany, not the Soviets. Neither side trusted the other though, and believed the other would try to play them off against the Nazis.
Ultimately it’s the same question but posed a bit later than “Should the west have agreed to cede the Sudetenland from the Czechs or gone to war immediately?”.
The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off.
The Soviets were attempting to let the west and the Nazis fight each other. Potato, potato. Hell, in 1940 Molotov was drinking tea with Hitler in Berlin, trying to get Hitler to give the USSR free reign in Bulgaria and Finland. Hitler meanwhile tried to get the USSR to fight the west over India and Iran. All three camps were consistently trying to get one to fight the other; ultimately the west decided the fight the Nazis first.
Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa
Do you have a source on a British warning to Germany? I can’t find anything mentioning this (not even a disputed claim or something). The British warnings to the USSR were sadly ignored; Stalin did not order the Red Army to get ready for an invasion, which was partially why the first few months of the war went so disastrously poorly for the Soviets.
Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.
Socialists were. In fact it caused a great rift between the Soviets and the socialists in other countries, since they could not believe that the Soviets would align themselves with the Nazis. Some distanced themselves from it, others realigned (causing a few socialist organisations to be banned for, get this, promoting the Nazis). These were very confusing times for a great many people.
You’re reading the spheres of influence aspect of Molotov-Ribbentrop with hermeneutics of suspicion. The implication on your end is that the Soviets expected the pact to hold, and to split Europe with Nazi Germany. This implies the expectation of a lasting alliance, which is immediately thrown out the window when you see just how much the Soviets were preparing for war against the Nazis, and that the Red Army was specifically told to watch out for German soldiers.
Regarding Poland in particular, the Soviet sphere of influence, again, was made up of areas Poland had violently annexed from countries like Lithuania and Ukraine only a couple decades prior. The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land. When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.
Would you want the entirety of Poland to go to the Nazis? Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?
As for the West, again, you ignore that at the time they were quite honest with wanting to contain the Bolsheviks. They were more than willing to work with the Nazis, America even kept trading with them during the war, and American factories were deliberately not targeted in Nazi Germany even if Nazis were hiding in them. Truman was honest:
The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off. France spread faulty rumors of a fabricated speech by Stalin wanting to conquest Europe, Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa, and the Nazis themselves were constantly posturing around either invading Britain, using Crete as a template for naval invasion, or making a deal with them. Before Barbarossa, Rudolf Hess flew to England, drawing the appearance of an impending deal.
The entirety of the pre-War period was a tumultuous game of trying to decide what the lines of the war would be. The west made it clear that it hated the Soviets, and the Soviets made it clear that they hated the Nazis, but did not want to risk both the Nazis and the west coming after them, which would have been unwinnable most likely. Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.
Most certainly not. Stalin wasn’t that stupid. He knew war would eventually come, even if he was a bit blindsided because Hitler invaded before winning the battle of Britain. But the Soviets most definitely intended to make use of the pact with Hitler for their own gain, that being the annexation of eastern Poland, Bessarabia, the Baltics and eastern Finland.
Do you think that the Soviets intended to let eastern Poland in their “sphere” as independent states? Since the protocols specifically leave the independence of any sort of Poland state up for debate later, the Soviets almost certainly intended to annex the land back. This is not exactly a controversial view, historians east and west agree on this reading.
The Soviets killed 100-150k people, deported another 300k to Siberia, and imprisoned half a million people. “Sparing them” has got to be a bit of a joke in this context, especially given that the USSR gave the Nazis carte-blanche to Holocaust away in western Poland. The Holocaust itself only became properly known to the world in 1942 anyway, so it’s not like the Soviets used that as their motivation to invade in 1939.
The USSR did not seriously believe that the west would ally with the Nazis against them. It was not a very realistic prospect either, since the west had already conceded quite a few points to the Soviets when they were negotiating the triple alliance regarding mutual defense, and that the west had signed several defense treaties to contain the Soviets specifically. They had not done so for say the Baltics, and even the guarantee for Poland only had provisions for direct action against Germany, not the Soviets. Neither side trusted the other though, and believed the other would try to play them off against the Nazis.
Ultimately it’s the same question but posed a bit later than “Should the west have agreed to cede the Sudetenland from the Czechs or gone to war immediately?”.
The Soviets were attempting to let the west and the Nazis fight each other. Potato, potato. Hell, in 1940 Molotov was drinking tea with Hitler in Berlin, trying to get Hitler to give the USSR free reign in Bulgaria and Finland. Hitler meanwhile tried to get the USSR to fight the west over India and Iran. All three camps were consistently trying to get one to fight the other; ultimately the west decided the fight the Nazis first.
Do you have a source on a British warning to Germany? I can’t find anything mentioning this (not even a disputed claim or something). The British warnings to the USSR were sadly ignored; Stalin did not order the Red Army to get ready for an invasion, which was partially why the first few months of the war went so disastrously poorly for the Soviets.
Socialists were. In fact it caused a great rift between the Soviets and the socialists in other countries, since they could not believe that the Soviets would align themselves with the Nazis. Some distanced themselves from it, others realigned (causing a few socialist organisations to be banned for, get this, promoting the Nazis). These were very confusing times for a great many people.