ElaraEnglish · 1 day agoKryptos K4 was found, not solved (most coverage skipped the verb)plus-squaremessage-squaremessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11message-squareKryptos K4 was found, not solved (most coverage skipped the verb)plus-squareElaraEnglish · 1 day agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 3 months agoReplacing the QPU with /dev/urandomplus-squaregithub.comexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkReplacing the QPU with /dev/urandomplus-squaregithub.comArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 3 months agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 4 months agoThe NSA's sabotaging of cryptographic standards is ongoing at the IETF; the deadline to object to the publication of draft-ietf-tls-mlkem is 7 July 2026nsa.2026.action.cr.yp.toexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkThe NSA's sabotaging of cryptographic standards is ongoing at the IETF; the deadline to object to the publication of draft-ietf-tls-mlkem is 7 July 2026nsa.2026.action.cr.yp.toArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 4 months agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 11 months agoIACR Held an Election. They Can’t Decrypt the Results.plus-squarewww.nytimes.comexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkIACR Held an Election. They Can’t Decrypt the Results.plus-squarewww.nytimes.comArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 11 months agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 1 year agoNSA and IETF: Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography?plus-squareblog.cr.yp.toexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkNSA and IETF: Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography?plus-squareblog.cr.yp.toArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 1 year agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 1 year agoChaCha12-BLAKE3: Secure, Simple and Fast authenticated and committing encryption for any CPUkerkour.comexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkChaCha12-BLAKE3: Secure, Simple and Fast authenticated and committing encryption for any CPUkerkour.comArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 1 year agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 1 year agoReplication of Quantum Factorisation Records with an 8-bit Home Computer, an Abacus, and a Dogplus-squareeprint.iacr.orgexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkReplication of Quantum Factorisation Records with an 8-bit Home Computer, an Abacus, and a Dogplus-squareeprint.iacr.orgArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 1 year agomessage-square0linkfedilink
hanno@lemmy.worldEnglish · 2 years agoMixing up Public and Private Keys in OpenID Connect deploymentsplus-squareblog.hboeck.deexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkMixing up Public and Private Keys in OpenID Connect deploymentsplus-squareblog.hboeck.dehanno@lemmy.worldEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agoAs expensive as a plane flight: Looking at some claims that quantum computers won't work.plus-squareblog.cr.yp.toexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkAs expensive as a plane flight: Looking at some claims that quantum computers won't work.plus-squareblog.cr.yp.toArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Jaromil@fed.dyne.org · 2 years agoOn the Proof of Ownership of Digital Walletsplus-squarewww.mdpi.comexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkOn the Proof of Ownership of Digital Walletsplus-squarewww.mdpi.comJaromil@fed.dyne.org · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
A1kmm@lemmy.amxl.comEnglish · 2 years agoProject Uniquonym - a concept (not yet implemented) for coupling pseudonymity with limits on sybil attacks / astroturfingplus-squarelemmy.amxl.comexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkProject Uniquonym - a concept (not yet implemented) for coupling pseudonymity with limits on sybil attacks / astroturfingplus-squarelemmy.amxl.comA1kmm@lemmy.amxl.comEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
OCTADE@soc.octade.net · 2 years agoGOLDILOCKER Brain Wallet - Generate OpenSSL Goldilocks Elliptic Curve Keys from Seed Phraseplus-squaremessage-squaremessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11message-squareGOLDILOCKER Brain Wallet - Generate OpenSSL Goldilocks Elliptic Curve Keys from Seed Phraseplus-squareOCTADE@soc.octade.net · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
OCTADE@soc.octade.net · edit-22 years agoKSRNG - Key Strike Random Generator (version 0.0.1)plus-squaremessage-squaremessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11message-squareKSRNG - Key Strike Random Generator (version 0.0.1)plus-squareOCTADE@soc.octade.net · edit-22 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
OCTADE@soc.octade.net · edit-22 years agoMEGARAND Extreme Overkill Random Seed Generatorplus-squaremessage-squaremessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11message-squareMEGARAND Extreme Overkill Random Seed Generatorplus-squareOCTADE@soc.octade.net · edit-22 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Jaromil@fed.dyne.org · 2 years agoLatticeGen: how to hide LLM conversations for Privacy-Aware Cloud AIplus-squarearxiv.orgexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkLatticeGen: how to hide LLM conversations for Privacy-Aware Cloud AIplus-squarearxiv.orgJaromil@fed.dyne.org · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years ago"The sins of the 90s": Questioning a puzzling claim by Meredith Whittaker about mass surveillanceplus-squareblog.cr.yp.toexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-link"The sins of the 90s": Questioning a puzzling claim by Meredith Whittaker about mass surveillanceplus-squareblog.cr.yp.toArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agoNIST Announces 14 Candidates to Advance to the Second Round of the Additional Digital Signatures for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Processplus-squarecsrc.nist.govexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkNIST Announces 14 Candidates to Advance to the Second Round of the Additional Digital Signatures for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Processplus-squarecsrc.nist.govArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
pancake@lemmygrad.ml · 2 years ago[Idea] FHE-RAM-based message routingplus-squaremessage-squaremessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11message-square[Idea] FHE-RAM-based message routingplus-squarepancake@lemmygrad.ml · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agoNSA's influence on cryptographic standards (slides from a 2022 talk by D. J. Bernstein)plus-squarecr.yp.toexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkNSA's influence on cryptographic standards (slides from a 2022 talk by D. J. Bernstein)plus-squarecr.yp.toArthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
yo_scottie_oh@lemmy.mlEnglish · 2 years agoPublic Key Cryptography - Computerphileplus-squareyoutu.beexternal-linkmessage-square0linkfedilinkarrow-up11
arrow-up11external-linkPublic Key Cryptography - Computerphileplus-squareyoutu.beyo_scottie_oh@lemmy.mlEnglish · 2 years agomessage-square0linkfedilink
